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A Prenuptial Agreement is Not Voidable Under the
Theory of Fraudulent Misrepresentation As To the
Value of Assets Unless the Party Attacking the
Agreement Proves Justifiable Reliance on the
Misrepresentation: Porreco v. Porreco
FAMILY LAW - PRENUPTIAL AGREEMENT - FRAUDULENT
MISREPRESENTATION - The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held
that a husband's misrepresentation as to the value of the engage-
ment ring, made during the process of forming the prenuptial
agreement, does not constitute fraud, and therefore void the pre-
nuptial agreement, when there is no justifiable reliance by the
party claiming that the representation of value was fraudulent.
Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A.2d 566 (Pa. 2002).
Louis Porreco ("Louis") was a forty-five year old, previously mar-
ried man who owned a car dealership.1 Louis started dating
Susan Porreco ("Susan"), a seventeen year old high school student
who lived with her parents and worked as a part-time employee at
a ski shop.2 The parties dated for over two years and then got en-
gaged.3
At trial, the parties argued over whether Susan knew, at the
time Louis presented her with the engagement ring, that it was
actually a cubic zirconium instead of a genuine diamond.4 The
trial court accepted Susan's testimony that she believed the en-
gagement ring contained a genuine diamond.5 Only after Susan
and Louis separated did Susan discover the engagement ring was
not a real diamond.6 Prior to their engagement, Louis had pre-
sented Susan with jewelry containing genuine stones.7 Even after
1. Porreco v. Porreco, 811 A-2d 566, 567 (Pa. 2002).
2. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 567.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 567-68.
6. Id. at 568.
7. Porreco, 811 A-2d at 568. An appraisal of Susan's jewelry prepared for Louis prior
to his marriage with Susan indicated the following jewelry: an 18 karat yellow gold, green
and black jade necklace worth $7,000; a yellow gold tourmalines peridot and diamond ring
containing eight diamonds, eight tourmalines, and eight peridots worth $2,500; an 18 karat
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they were married, Louis continued to provide Susan with jewelry
containing real gems.8
Prior to the marriage, Louis presented Susan with a prenuptial
agreement.9 Louis prepared personal financial statements for
Susan and himself, which listed the value of the engagement ring
at $21,000, but did not actually state that the gem was a dia-
mond.'" Susan, after having an attorney review the document,
agreed to its terms."
The parties separated over ten years later, at which time Susan
had the engagement ring appraised." Susan was informed that
the gem was not a diamond and not worth $21,000, as indicated in
the statement prepared by Louis."3 Consequently, in the divorce
proceeding, Susan filed a Petition for Special Relief to set aside
the prenuptial agreement entered into with Louis on the following
three grounds: (1) that she was fraudulently induced to enter the
prenuptial agreement by Louis' misrepresentation of the value of
the engagement ring; (2) that the confidential relationship be-
tween Susan and Louis was breached by Louis; and (3) that the
duty of full and fair disclosure, pursuant to the Pennsylvania Su-
white gold dinner ring with diamonds worth $10,000, and; a sapphire and diamond ring in
yellow gold, valued at $13,000. Id. at 568 n.1.
8. Id. An appraisal of Susan's jewelry acquired subsequent to marriage is as follows: a
14 karat yellow gold cuff-style bangle bracelet, valued at $12,500; a 14 karat yellow gold
diamond collar worth $7,500, a 14 karat yellow gold amethyst and diamond pearl enhancer,
valued at $2,000; an 18 karat yellow gold sapphire and diamond ring with 12 baguette
diamonds, valued at $17,000; a 14 karat yellow gold sapphire and diamond bracelet, worth
$7,500, and a set of 14 karat gold diamond earrings, valued at $3,500. Id.
9. Id. at 568. Prenuptial agreement is defined as "[o]ne entered into by prospective
spouses prior to marriage but in contemplation and in consideration thereof; by it, the
property or other financial rights of one or both of the prospective spouses are determined
or are secured to one or both of them or their children." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 819 (6th
ed. 1991). Louis informed Susan she should have an attorney review the prenuptial agree-
ment. Id. The second draft of the prenuptial agreement provided that, in the event of di-
vorce, Susan would receive $3,500 for each year of marriage in place of alimony, alimony
pendente lite, and spousal support. Id. In addition, Louis would provide Susan with a vehi-
cle and health coverage for one year. Id. Also, the parties would retain their separate prop-
erty, including any increased value in the separate property. Id.
10. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 568. Susan's assets were valued at $46,692 and Louis' net
worth was $3,317,666. Id.
11. Id. Susan testified she understood the consequences of signing the prenuptial
agreement. Id. Susan's attorney reviewed the agreement but did not conduct any negotia-
tions on her behalf. Id.
12. Id. at 569.
13. Id.
Porreco v. Porreco
preme Court's decision in Simeone v. Simeone, owed to Susan
was violated by Louis.15
The trial court, finding Susan's testimony credible, invalidated
the prenuptial agreement, concluding that a confidential relation-
ship existed.'6 The breach of the confidential relationship occurred
when Louis had the prenuptial agreement drafted substantially in
his favor. The trial court also found that Louis had materially
misrepresented the nature and value of the engagement ring, and
that Susan signed the prenuptial agreement in reliance on this
misrepresentation. 7 The trial court did not address Susan's last
claim, that Louis violated his duty to provide a full and fair disclo-
sure to her, since the court had determined the prenuptial agree-
ment was invalidated on the other two grounds. 8
The Superior Court, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed the
trial court decision 2-1.1' The majority agreed that Susan had
proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that Louis fraudulently
induced her to sign the prenuptial agreement by materially mis-
representing the value of the engagement ring.20 The Superior
Court did not address the merits of the issue regarding breach of a
confidential relationship.2
In Judge Kelly's dissent, he stated that he would not have in-
validated the entire prenuptial agreement.22 Rather, Judge Kelly
would have required Louis to compensate Susan $21,000 for the
value of the engagement ring as stated in the prenuptial agree-
ment, and then enforced the remainder of the agreement. Al-
though the Superior Court had previously quashed the appeal of
Louis as interlocutory, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania va-
cated the Superior Court's order and remanded to consider Louis'
appeal.24
The issue before the Supreme Court was "whether the trial
court properly concluded that Louis fraudulently induced Susan to
sign the prenuptial agreement by misrepresenting the value of the
14. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
15. Id. Prenuptial agreements require full and fair disclosure of the financial positions
of the parties involved. Id. (citing Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990)).
16. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 569.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 569.
20. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 569.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 569.
24. Id. at 569 n.3.
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engagement ring on the list of her individual assets, which he pre-
paired as part of the prenuptial agreement."25 The majority held
that the trial court did not properly conclude that Louis fraudu-
lently induced Susan into signing the prenuptial agreement by
misrepresenting the value of the ring because Susan's reliance
was not justifiable since she could have had the ring appraised.26
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the Supe-
rior Court to determine the issue of whether a confidential rela-
tionship existed between Louis and Susan.27 The trial court had
made a positive determination on that issue, but the Superior
Court never reached the issue.28
The Supreme Court began its discussion of the issue in Porreco
with a recitation of the standard of review for an appeal from a
court sitting in equity.' The Supreme Court is bound by the facts
of the court below, when those facts are supported in the record by
competent evidence." However, the Supreme Court is free to re-
view conclusions of law. 1
The majority then began its substantive analysis by looking at
the criteria for enforcing a prenuptial agreement, which had re-
cently been reevaluated in a previous decision."2 In Simeone, the
criteria previously applied, containing a paternalistic assumption,
was rejected, meaning the court no longer had to scrutinize and
hold unenforceable those agreements that did not make a reason-
able provision for the other spouse.' Now spouses were treated as
having equal status, and women were treated as knowledgeable
enough to understand the nature of the contracts that they en-
tered.' As a result of Simeone, the court applied the same criteria
25. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 570.
26. Id. at 571-72.
27. Id. at 572.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 569.
30. See Kepple v. Fairman Drilling Co., 615 A.2d 1298, 1302 (Pa. 1992).
31. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 569. "However, no such deference is mandated for conclusions
of law, and we are at liberty to review such conclusions." Id. See Presbytery of Beaver-
Butler of United Presbyterian Church v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, 489 A.2d 1317,
1323 (Pa. 1885).
32. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 569-70.
33. Id. at 569-70.
34. Id. at 570. "Such decisions rested upon a belief that spouses are of unequal status
and that women are not knowledgeable enough to understand the nature of the contracts
that they enter. Id. (quoting Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990)).
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it used to evaluate contracts to evaluate prenuptial agreements.,
However, since parties to a prenuptial agreement have not always
dealt with each other at arm's length, the court reaffirmed "the
long standing principle that a full and fair disclosure of the finan-
cial positions of the parties is required," stating that "[a]bsent this
disclosure, a material misrepresentation in the inducement for
entering a prenuptial agreement may be asserted." In other
words, prenuptial agreements can be invalidated when fraudu-
lently obtained." On the other hand, "[i]f an agreement provide[d]
that full disclosure had been made, a presumption of full disclo-
sure [arose]."' "If a spouse attempt[ed] to rebut this presumption
through an assertion of fraud or misrepresentation then this pre-
sumption [could] be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence."'
Thus, the Simeone court identified two alternative reasons for
voiding a prenuptial agreement as follows: (1) "any ground under
the common law (such as fraud); and (2) where a party fail[ed] to
make "full and fair" disclosure of his or her own assets prior to
entering the agreement."0
The majority opinion went on to examine the issue of whether
the trial court properly concluded that Louis fraudulently induced
Susan into signing the prenuptial agreement by misrepresenting
the value of the ring on the list of her individual assets that he
prepared.41 The majority listed the elements for fraudulent mis-
representation, which if all were present, would have invalidated
the contract, as long as the party alleging the fraud could have
proven these elements by clear and convincing evidence.42  The
majority opinion focused on the fifth element of fraudulent mis-
35. Id. "Prenuptial agreements are contracts, and, as such, should be evaluated under
the same criteria as are applicable to other types of contracts." Id. (quoting Simeone, 581
A.2d 162, 165 (Pa. 1990)). See also Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423, 431 (Pa. 1987)).
36. Id. (quoting Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990)).
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990)).
39. Id. (quoting Simeone, 581 A.2d 162, 167 (Pa. 1990)).
40. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 570. See Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa.1990).
41. Id. at 570-71. The Supreme Court was not asked to decide the extent of the "full
and fair" disclosure rule, since neither the trial court nor the Superior Court had relied on
it to void the prenuptial agreement. Id. at 570.
42. Id. The elements to prove fraudulent misrepresentation are as follows:
(1) a representation; (2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made
falsely, with knowledge of its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false;
(4) with the intent of misleading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on
the misrepresentation; and (6) resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.
Id. (citing Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. 1999); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d 882, 889
(Pa. 1994)).
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representation, which required "justifiable reliance on the misrep-
resentation."3 In order for the reliance to be justifiable, it had to
be reasonable. 44 Even though reasonableness of the reliance may
be affected by the nature of the relationship between the parties,
the court would have found the reliance unreasonable if the party
claiming reliance had ample opportunity to investigate the alleged
fraudulent statements, and yet did not investigate.45
In addition, the court, in assessing justifiable reliance, may look
to see if the recipient knew or should have known the representa-
tion was false.4 6 Also, where the means of obtaining information
about the representation were not equal to both parties, reliance
on the party with superior information is justified.47 However,
where parties have equal opportunity for investigation of repre-
sentations, neither is entitled to rely on such representations.8
Again, the court reiterates that parties to a prenuptial agreement
are treated the same as those to any other contract, with a duty to
investigate and take due care of their bargain. 9
The majority's analysis then turned to the case at hand, con-
cluding that Susan's reliance on Louis' misrepresentation of the
value of the engagement ring, as noted in the prenuptial agree-
ment, was not justifiable." The reason for this conclusion was be-
cause Susan had possession of the ring and was free to have the
ring appraised, yet did not elect to do so until after the parties
separated."1 Therefore, Susan's reliance was deemed unreason-
able because she chose to rely on Louis' statement of the value of
the ring instead of doing her own investigation into the ring's
value. 2
The majority opinion points out that Susan undermined her
supposed reliance when she testified she would have signed the
43. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 570-71.
44. Id. See also In re Allegheny International, Inc., 954 F.2d 167, 178 (3d Cir. 1992)
(applying Pennsylvania law). "A misrepresentation, even if relied upon, has no legal effect
unless the recipient's reliance on it is justified." Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571 (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 cmt. d. (1981)).
45. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571.
46. Id. See also Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 285 A.2d 451, 455 (Pa. 1971)
(citing Emery v. Third Nat'l Bank, 162 A.2d 281, 283 (Pa. 1932)).
47. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571 (citing Siskin v. Cohen, 70 A.2d 293, 295 (Pa. 1950)).
48. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571 (citing Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 179 A. 565, 566
(Pa. 1935)).
49. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571.
50. Id. at 571-72. The Supreme Court was bound by the factual conclusions of the trial
court. Id.
51. Id. at 572.
52. Id.
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prenuptial agreement no matter what it expressed.' Subse-
quently, Susan recanted her earlier statement expressing she
would not have signed an agreement that "included lies." Al-
though the court thought the inconsistent statements cast some
doubt as to the importance of the value of the ring in making her
decision to sign the prenuptial agreement, it did not examine this
issue further because it held that Susan's reliance was unreason-
able.' The majority also considered that although the engage-
ment ring was a conditional gift, which did not vest until mar-
riage, Susan still could have had the ring appraised instead of re-
lying on Louis' statement of its value.'
Chief Justice Zappala, concurring, joined in the majority opinion
of Justice Newman, but wrote separately to address his concern
for the filing of Justice Eakin's dissenting opinion, which was ex-
pressed in rhyme. 7 Chief Justice Zappala felt that the rhyming
opinion undermined the integrity of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania and would alter the perception of the court in the eyes of
those whose lives and interests were affected by its decisions.' In
addition, the Chief Justice stated that no matter before the court
was ever frivolous.59
Justice Cappy concurred with the result reached by the major-
ity, but wrote separately to address the same concern that the
Chief Justice raised. ° Justice Cappy also thought that citizen's
perception of the court would be impaired when opinions were re-
duced to rhyme.6 Justice Cappy reiterated Chief Justice Zap-
pala's view that all cases were important.62
Justice Castille joined in concurring with the majority opinion,
but wrote separately to address other issues, which the courts be-
low may have to address in order to resolve this matter.63 Susan
originally brought three separate grounds for invalidating the
53. Id. at 571 n.5. The trial court found credible Susan's testimony that if she had
known of Louis' misrepresentation of the value of the ring she would "not have married the
man"; the Supreme Court was bound by the trial courts findings that this was a material
misrepresentation to Susan's participation in the agreement and that she relied on it. Id.
54. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571 n.5.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 572 n.6. See also Lindh v. Surman, 742 A.2d 643, 645 (Pa. 1999).
57. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 572 (Zappala, C.J., concurring).
58. Id. (Zappala, C.J., concurring).
59. Id. (Zappala, C.J., concurring).
60. Id. at 572-73 (Cappy, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 573 (Cappy, J., concurring).
62. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 573 (Cappy, J., concurring).
63. Id. (Castille, J., concurring).
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prenuptial agreement: (1) fraudulent inducement by misrepresen-
tation of the value of the ring; (2) breached confidential relation-
ship; and (3) violation of the duty of full and fair disclosure.' Only
the first of these three grounds, involving fraudulent inducement
by misrepresentation, was before the Supreme Court." The confi-
dential relationship issue was remanded to the Superior Court to
determine if the agreement was properly voided on the trial
court's finding that there was a breach of a confidential relation-
ship.66 Justice Castille noted that if the full and fair disclosure
issue needed to be addressed, then the Superior Court should first
remand that issue to the trial court for a ruling.67 Upon remand-
ing the case, the prenuptial agreement could be invalidated on
either of the two remaining grounds.68
The dissent of Justice Saylor, joined by Justice Nigro, would not
impose a duty to investigate upon Susan.69 In furtherance of this
position, Justice Saylor argued that Susan should only have had
to prove justifiable reliance, which falls between reasonable and
bare reliance. In addition, "a recipient's fault in not knowing or
discovering the facts before making the contract does not make his
reliance unjustified unless it amounts to a failure to act in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of fair deal-
ing."71 Also, Justice Saylor argued that the majority opinion relied
upon a case that could be distinguished from the present case,
where the Appellant and Appellee were a buyer and seller, and
which drew its holding from statutory authority.
7 2
The dissent next examined the facts that: (1) Louis listed the
value of the ring on the financial statement right before Susan
signed the prenuptial agreement; (2) Louis gave Susan genuine
jewels prior to the engagement; (3) the parties differed greatly in
64. Id. (Castille, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 574 (Castille, J., concurring). All six elements of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
66. Id. (Castille, J., concurring).
67. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 574 (Castille, J., concurring).
68. Id. (Castille, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 574. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting). See also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 72-75 (1995).
71. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 574-75 (Saylor, J., dissenting). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 172 (1981).
72. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 575 n.1 (Saylor, J., dissenting). "[Aippellee had a duty to in-
vestigate where there was an equal opportunity to ascertain the facts affecting value. Id.
See also Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 179 A. 565 (Pa. 1935). "[A]ffirmations of value
between buyers and sellers could not be construed as a warranty." Porreco, 811 A.2d at
575. See Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 179 A. 565, 567 n.1 (Pa. 1935) (citing section 12
of the Uniform Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543).
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age and experience; (4) the trial court found Susan's testimony
credible; and (5) no evidence indicated that Susan failed to act in
good faith.7" Taking these facts into consideration, Justice Saylor
determined that the parties did not deal at arm's length.74 Justice
Saylor would have held that the trial court did not err in conclud-
ing that Louis fraudulently induced Susan into signing the pre-
nuptial agreement by misrepresenting the value of the engage-
ment ring.
5
The dissent of Justice Eakin took the form of a rhyme." This
dissent also points out that the parties were not of equal age and
experience.77 This difference in age and experience, according to
Justice Eakin, would justify Susan's reliance on the misrepresen-
tation of the value of the engagement ring in the prenuptial
agreement." In other words, Susan was not under a duty to have
73. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 575 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
74. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
75. Id. (Saylor, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 575-76 (Eakin, J., dissenting). Justice Eakin's dissent reads as follows:
A groom must expect matrimonial pandemonium
when his spouse finds he's given her a cubic zirconium
instead of a diamond in her engagement band,
the one he said was worth twenty-one grand.
Our deceiver would claim that when his bride relied
on his claim of value, she was not justified
for she should have appraised it; and surely she could have,
but the question is whether a bride-to-be would have.
The realities of the parties control the equation,
and here there're not comparable in sophistication;
the reasonableness of her reliance we just cannot gauge
with a yardstick of equal experience and age.
This must be remembered when applying the test
by which the 'reasonable fiancde' is assessed.
She was 19, he was nearly 30 years older;
was it unreasonable for her to believe what he told her?
Given their history and Pygmalion relation,
I find her reliance was with justification.
Given his accomplishment and given her youth,
was it unjustifiable for her to think he told the truth?
Or for every prenuptial, is it now a must
that you treat your betrothed with presumptive mistrust?
Do we mean reliance on your beloved's representation
is not justifiable, absent third party verification?
Love, not suspicion, is the underlying foundation
of parties entering the marital relation;
mistrust is not required, and should not be made a priority.
Accordingly, I must depart from the reasoning of the majority.
Id. at 575-76 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
7M Porreco, 811 A.2d at 575-76 (Eakin, J., dissenting). "Determining whether reliance
on a misrepresentation is justified is generally dependent, at least in part, upon such fac-
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the ring appraised.79 Justice Eakin held that mistrust should not
be required in the marital relationship, and departed from the
majority opinion.8°
In the 1990 case of Simeone v. Simeone,8' the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania was one of the first courts in the country to change
its policy regarding the evaluation of criteria for enforcing pre-
marital contracts. 8 Simeone established that the traditional prin-
ciples of contract law provided the appropriate remedies when a
prenuptial contract was procured through fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or duress.83 With the Simeone decision, the court departed
from the paternalistic approach in Estate of Geyer84 and its prede-
cessors, going all the way back to the Appeal of Neely" in 1889,
which held that the validity of a prenuptial contract could be
based either on the reasonableness of its provisions or on the full
and fair disclosure of the parties' assets."
The last Supreme Court of Pennsylvania case holding that the
validity of a prenuptial contract could be based on either the rea-
sonableness of its provisions or on the full and fair disclosure of
the parties' assets was Estate of Geyer." The issue in Estate of
Geyer was whether the antenuptial agreement was valid based on
a reasonable provision for the intended spouse or a full and fair
tors as the respective intelligence and experience of the parties... " Id. at 575 n. 1 (quoting
Benevento v. Life USA Holding, Inc., 61 F.Supp.2d 407, 417 (E.D.Pa.1999)) (citations omit-
ted).
79. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 575-76 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
80. Id. (Eakin, J., dissenting).
81. 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990).
82. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165; 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, at 478-79
(4th ed. 1993).
83. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165; 5 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, at 476
(4th ed. 1993).
84. 533 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1987).
85. 16 A. 883 (Pa. 1889).
86. James 0. Person, Jr., Annotation, Failure to Disclose Extent or Value of Property
Owned as Ground for Avoiding Premarital Contract, 3 A.L.R.5th 394 (1993). See Appeal of
Neely, 16 A. 883 (Pa. 1889); In re Flannery's Estate, 173 A. 303 (Pa. 1934); In re Groffs
Estate, 19 A.2d 107 (Pa. 1941); In re Emery's Estate, 66 A.2d 262 (Pa. 1949); In re Snyder's
Estate, 100 A-2d 67 (Pa. 1953) (disapproved on other grounds by In re Estate of Lock, 244
A.2d 677 (Pa. 1968)); In re Estate of Zeigler, 113 A.2d 271 (Pa. 1955) (recognizing rule); In
re Estate of Kaufmann, 171 A.2d 48 (Pa. 1961); In re Estate of Gelb, 228 A.2d 367 (Pa.
1967); In re Estate of Vallish, 244 A.2d 745 (Pa. 1968); In re Estate of Hillegass, 244 A-2d
672 (Pa. 1968) (overruled by Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990)); In re Estate of Perelman,
263 A.2d 375 (Pa. 1970); In re Estate of Ratony, 277 A.2d 791 (Pa. 1971) (recognizing rule);
In re Estate of Harrison, 319 A.2d 5 (Pa. 1974) (recognizing rule); Estate of Friedman, 398
A.2d 615 (Pa. 1978); In re Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d 423 (Pa. 1987) (overruled by Simeone,
581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990)).
87. Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d at 427.
disclosure of the parties' assets.88 The presumption is that an an-
tenuptial agreement is valid and binding on the parties entering
into it.8'9 The party seeking to nullify the antenuptial agreement
has the burden of proving the invalidity of the antenuptial agree-
ment by clear and convincing evidence that the deceased spouse at
the time of the agreement did not either make a reasonable provi-
sion for the intended spouse or a full and fair disclosure of the par-
ties' assets.9" The Estate of Geyer court determined that Mr. Geyer
never revealed to Mrs. Geyer the extent of his real estate holdings
and misrepresented his ownership interest in Geyer Kraft
Korner." Mr. Geyer actually retained ownership interest, not his
first wife, in this store valued at $120,000, which comprised more
than 50% of Mr. Geyer's net worth at the time of the agreement.
9 2
The Estate of Geyer court held that where the facts prove that
Mrs. Geyer was misled (more than 50% undervaluation of estate is
less than full and fair disclosure) and simultaneously the an-
tenuptial agreement states there was full disclosure, the antenup-
tial agreement's statement is of no value.9" Next, the Estate of
Geyer court looked at the reasonable provision for Mrs. Geyer."
Adequacy of the reasonableness of the agreement's provisions
would be measured by the terms of the agreement itself, and not
the events that occurred subsequent to it.95 Here, Mrs. Geyer sur-
rendered her right to $300,000 dollars in decedents' estate, relin-
quished her right to the lifetime military pension of her second
husband, and gave up her two jobs, in exchange for a $20,000 con-
veyance, title to the marital residence, and unspecified household
furnishings.96 The Estate of Geyer court determined that there
was not a reasonable provision for Mrs. Geyer in the agreement
because the $20,000 conveyance was merely the present lump sum
value of the military pension.97 Additionally, the unspecified fur-
nishings, marital residence, and limited employment opportuni-
ties would not be enough to maintain Mrs. Geyer's lifestyle after
88. Id. at 427.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 428.
92. Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d at 428.
93. Id. at 428.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Hillegass Estate, 244 A.2d 672 (Pa. 1968)).
96. Id.
97. Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d at 428.
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Mr. Geyer's death." Therefore, there was neither full and fair dis-
closure of the assets, nor a reasonable provision for Mrs. Geyer in
the antenuptial agreement, and she could elect to take her statu-
tory share of Mr. Geyer's estate.99
Chief Justice Nix's dissent in the Estate of Geyer provides an in-
depth history of the law relating to the antenuptial agreement. °0
When the antenuptial agreement first developed, the societal
norm was marriage.' At this time, the husband's duty was to
provide for his family while the wife maintained the household
and raised the kids.0 2 When the husband predeceased his wife,
she was dependent on the assets left by her husband for her main-
tenance and support.' The courts, mirroring the state interest of
not wanting to see widows with no alternative but reliance on pub-
lic welfare for their survival, based the validity of antenuptial
agreements upon the adequacy of the provision made for "the
wife's future security and financial protection . . . ."l The courts
in these early decisions held the belief that the future wife was in
an inferior bargaining position and therefore could not bargain at
arm's length with her suitor.0 5 Hence, when there was an objec-
tion to the antenuptial agreement by the wife, the court would
first consider the reasonableness of the provision made for the in-
tended wife's financial security.0 6
Chief Justice Nix's dissent goes on to explain that there have
been societal changes during the second half of the last century
that warrant reconsideration of the principles that governed an-
tenuptial agreements in the past.0 7 The wife's and husband's
roles have changed, such that now either can be the breadwinner
or homemaker.' Oftentimes, the wife and husband both work,
and in some cases, the wife may even earn more than her hus-
band.' O9 A constitutional mandate and public policy of gender neu-
trality and equality replaced the stereotype that females were
98. Id.
99. Id. at 430.
100. Id. at 431 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
101. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
102. Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d at 431 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
103. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
104. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting) (citing Barnhart v. Barnhart, 101 A.2d 904, 908 (Pa.
1954)).
105. Id. at 432. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
106. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting). See, e.g., Kaufmann Estate, 171 A-2d 48, 51 (Pa. 1961).
107. Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d at 433 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
108. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 433 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
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inferior."' Although, this goal of gender neutrality and equality
has not been reached yet and gender discrimination still takes
place."' Chief Justice Nix opined that the Supreme Court was not
"serv[ing] the cause of true equality by creating legal fictions, even
when those fictions were designed to protect against some of these
inequities."" ' Moreover, antenuptial agreements are employed by
more sophisticated parties who are aware of the effects of such
agreements."' These agreements are put into effect to effectuate
their plans for the disposition of their property.14 Therefore, a
surviving spouse can agree to accept a share that is less than the
statutory provision and it is not against public policy for an an-
tenuptial contract to make such a condition for entering into the
marriage."' In addition, the normal rules of contract will ade-
quately protect all parties involved and the legal fiction can be
discarded."6
The Simeone v. Simeone case overruled the Estate of Geyer's ba-
sis for validity, which was premised on the belief that spouses are
of unequal status and that women do not understand the contracts
that they enter into."7 The general issue in Simeone was whether
the prenuptial agreement was valid."' Again, the Simeone court
reiterates that the basis for the Estate of Geyer, which rested on
the belief that spouses are of unequal status and that women do
not understand the contracts that they enter into, is no longer
valid."' The law has advanced to the point where men and women
are recognized as having equal status.20 The Simeone court
agreed with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Nix in the
Estate of Geyer that evidenced a shift away from a paternalistic
approach of protecting women towards an equal treatment ap-
proach. 2 ' The Estate of Geyer also departed from traditional rules
of contract law when it allowed the consideration of knowledge of
the contracting parties and the reasonableness of their bargain as
110. Id. at 434 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
111. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
112. Estate of Geyer, 533 A.2d at 434 (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
114. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
115. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Nix, C.J., dissenting).
117. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.
118. Id. at 163.
119. Id. at 165.
120. Id. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (constitutional prohibition of sex discrimination
in laws of the Commonwealth).
121. Simeone, 581 A.2d at 165.
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factors to determine if the agreement was valid. 122 The Simeone
court would now apply traditional principles of contract law to
prenuptial agreements, which would also provide adequate reme-
dies for an agreement procured through fraud, misrepresentation,
or duress.2 ' No longer would knowledge of the parties and the
reasonableness of their bargain enter as factors for considera-
tion. 1 24 The Simeone court found no merit in the wife's argument
to void the agreement on the basis that she did not consult with
independent legal counsel. 2' The Simeone court reasoned that
this would be a paternalistic interference with the parties' free-
dom to contract.' The wife also failed to prove by clear and con-
vincing evidence that her husband's disclosure of the assets was
understated. 127 The husband fully disclosed the value of his classic
car collection and even included cars he hoped to inherit.1 28 The
wife's last contention, that she was under duress to sign the pre-
nuptial agreement on the eve of her wedding, also failed and was
unsupported by the record. 29 Thus, the Simeone court, in applying
traditional contract principles, held that the prenuptial agreement
was valid and enforceable.3
After Simeone, the court evaluated prenuptial agreements un-
der the same criteria as other contracts and "recognized two alter-
nate bases for invalidating a prenuptial agreement: (1) any ground
for voiding a contract under the common law (such as fraud); and
(2) where a party fails to make 'full and fair disclosure' of his or
her assets prior to entering the agreement." 3' The Porreco case
considered only the first of these two alternative grounds, looking
at whether there was a reasonable justifiable reliance on a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation as to the assets listed in the prenuptial
agreement that would have induced the other party to enter into




125. Id. at 166.




130. Id. at 168.
131. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 570.
132. Id.
133. 729 A.2d 555 (Pa. 1999).
656 Vol. 42
Gibbs v. Ernst '34 cases to establish the elements of fraudulent mis-
representation.'35
The issue in Bortz was whether an agent was liable to the buyer
for fraudulent misrepresentation, when the agent did not give the
buyer the septic system reports and the agent said the dye test
was clear.3 ' The court applied the elements of intentional misrep-
resentation.137 The majority looked at the record and found no
evidence supporting the conclusion that the agent misrepresented
any facts to the buyer.' The agent told the buyer the dye test was
clear, relying on information from the Title Company, not knowing
the information was false."9 There was no evidence indicating the
agent intended to mislead the buyer.140  Therefore, the court in
Bortz held that the agent was not liable for intentional fraudulent
misrepresentation or concealment because the record could not
support that conclusion.
4 1
The issue in Gibbs was whether intentional misrepresentation
was applicable in the adoption context.' 4 ' The court listed the
same elements of intentional misrepresentation as in Bortz.'4'
Seeing that the sister states had unanimously applied intentional
misrepresentation to the adoption context, and recognizing that
Pennsylvania had long held intentional misrepresentation action-
able in other settings, the court held it would also be applied to
the adoption context.'"
134. 647 A.2d 882 (Pa. 1994).
135. Id. See also Bortz v. Noon, 729 A.2d 555, 560 (Pa. 1999); Gibbs v. Ernst, 647 A.2d
882, 889 (Pa. 1994); W. PAGE KEATON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105
(5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
136. Bortz, 729 A.2d at 560.
137. Id.
The elements of intentional misrepresentation are as follows: (1) A representation;
(2) which is material to the transaction at hand; (3) made falsely, with knowledge of
its falsity or recklessness as to whether it is true or false; (4) with the intent of mis-
leading another into relying on it; (5) justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation;
and, (6) the resulting injury was proximately caused by reliance.
Id. See also Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 889 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977)).




142. Gibbs, 647 A-2d at 889.
143. Id.; W. PAGE KEATON, PROSSER AND KEATON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 105 (5th ed.
1984); See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1977).
144. Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 887 (citing D. Marianne Brower Blair, Getting the Truth and
Nothing but the Truth: The Limits of Liability for Wrongful Adoption, 67 N.D. L. REV. 851,
856 (1992). See, e.g., Gibbs, 647 A.2d at 889 n.13; Michael J. v. County of Los Angeles, 247
Cal. Rptr. 504 (Cal. 1998); Reidy v. Albany County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 193 A.2d 992 (N.Y.
1993); Burr v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 491 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1986). Gibbs, 647 A.2d at
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Next, the majority in Porreco looked to cases that demonstrated
reasonable justifiable reliance on the representations of another.1 5
The first case relied upon by the court was In re Allegheny Inter-
national, Inc.146 In this case, the issue of whether Snyder's con-
tract was void or voidable for fraud or mistake was not reached by
the bankruptcy court.'47 Nevertheless, the In re Allegheny Interna-
tional, Inc. court recognized that, under Pennsylvania law, a per-
son seeking to avoid the contract must prove the misrepresenta-
tion in the contract was reasonably relied on and was the basis for
entering into the contract.'48 The record shows that Snyder did not
disclose the accounting problems with Bra-Con and Sciaky to his
superiors that were in fact false reports of a return to profitability
for these companies.'49 These false reports induced Allegheny In-
ternational to have Snyder sign an employment contract because
of his reputation as a turnaround expert.15 ° The case was re-
manded to the district court because the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit concluded that there was sufficient evidence before
the bankruptcy court to permit a finding that the contract was
voidable for mistake or misrepresentation.'
The issue in the second case, Scaife Company v Rockwell-
Standard Corporation,"' was whether there was sufficient evi-
dence to prove fraudulent misrepresentation when Scaife bought
the TSA division of Rockwell but was not informed by Rockwell
that the furnace heat exchangers were defective."' Rockwell ar-
gued that Scaife knew or should have known of the defects in the
heat exchanger and therefore could not justifiably believe the mis-
representation."' The Scaife court continued to apply the rule
that where the buyer and seller of a product have equal access to
information regarding a product, and the product is open for in-
889; Kubik v. Letteri, 614 A.2d 1110 (Pa. 1992); Thomas v. Seaman, 304 A.2d 134 (Pa.
1973); Savitz v. Weinstein, 149 A.2d 110 (Pa. 1959).
145. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571.
146. Id. In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 954 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1992).
147. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 954 F.2d at 177.
148. Id. at 178; See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981). "d. Justifica-
tion. A misrepresentation, even if relied upon, has not legal effect unless the recipient's
reliance on it is justified." Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164, cmt.
d. (1981)).
149. Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 954 F.2d at 179.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 178-81.
152. 285 A.2d 451 (Pa. 1971).
153. Scaife Co. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 285 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 1971).
154. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571; Scaife Co., 285 A.2d at 455; Emery v. Third Nat'l Bank,
162 A. 281 (Pa. 1932).
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spection, and the buyer fails to inspect the product, the buyer can-
not later claim that he was deceived by the seller's misrepresenta-
tion.'55 Rockwell argued that there were reports showing TSA's
slow progress in the gas furnace market, Scaife executives should
have had an idea of the problem, and upon inspection of the heat
exchanger, the defect would have been obvious."' Scaife repudi-
ated each of these allegations, and the court held that there was
enough clear and convincing evidence that a jury could have de-
cided that Scaife had been a victim of fraudulent misrepresenta-
tion.
157
The issue in the third case, Siskin v. Cohen,"8 was whether
Siskin relied on Cohen's fraudulent misrepresentation as to the
receipts and net profits of a taproom business."' The court fol-
lowed the rule that representations of the party possessing the
superior information may be relied upon, when the means of ob-
taining that information were not equal to both parties.6 ° The
chancellor found evidence supporting the fact that Siskin relied on
the misrepresentations of Cohen when contracting to buy the tap-
room business.' Although the son made a couple of visits on the
weekends and observed that the taproom was crowded, his inex-
perience in the taproom business did not lead him to the realiza-
tion that most of the patrons were there to enjoy the music and
not to buy beverages.'62 Therefore, the court, discovering that the
investigation by the father and son was inadequate due to lack of
experience with the taproom business, held that Siskin relied on
the fraudulent misrepresentations of Cohen.6 3
The final case that examined reliance on statements was Moore
v. Steinman Hardware Co.,' a case where Mrs. Moore alleged
that the President of Steinman Hardware Co. (her brother-in-law)
fraudulently misrepresented the shares in the company in order to
induce her to sell her late husband's shares. 6' In Moore, the court
pointed out that a buyer or seller was not entitled to rely on
155. Scaife Co., 285 A.2d at 455.
156. Id. at 455.
157. Id. at 455-56.
158. 70 A.2d 293 (Pa. 1950).
159. Siskin v. Cohen, 70 A.2d 293, 294 (Pa. 1950).
160. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571; Siskin, 70 A.2d at 295; Emery v. Third Nat'l Bank of
Pittsburgh, 171 A. 881, 882 (Pa. 1934).
161. Siskin, 70 A.2d at 295.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 179 A. 565 (Pa. 1935).
165. Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 179 A. 565, 566 (Pa. 1935).
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statements when there was an opportunity to discover the vari-
ables impacting the value of the item to be sold.6 ' This concept
was rooted in statutory authority, which provided that no affirma-
tion of value nor statement of opinion between buyers and sellers
would be construed as a warranty.67
Porreco, using the aforementioned rationales, imposed a duty on
Susan to investigate the value of her assets as listed on the finan-
cial statement in the prenuptial agreement.'68 Furthermore, the
court held that her failure to investigate the value of the ring,
which she final did after separation, was unreasonable. 9 The fail-
ure to investigate the value of the ring was held to be unreason-
able, because she had ample time to have the ring appraised if the
ring's value was such an overriding factor as to whether she would
enter into the prenuptial agreement 7 ° Justice Newman, in Por-
reco, also wrote that the court would judge the reasonableness of
the reliance with contract standards. 7' This is a departure from
an early decision, Kline v. Kline,'72 which recognized that the par-
ties to an antenuptial agreement were not under a duty to obtain
knowledge of the value of each others assets. 73
The majority's holding, that the trial court erred in concluding
that Louis fraudulently induced Susan into signing the prenuptial
agreement by misrepresenting the value of the ring because
Susan's reliance was not justifiable (since she could have had the
ring appraised), was the correct conclusion. "4 Even though the
court was bound by the trial court's finding that the misrepresen-
tation was both material to Susan's participation in the agreement
and that she relied on it, it held that her reliance on the misrepre-
sentation was not reasonable.'' The Porreco court held that her
166. Moore, 179 A. at 566 n.2 (citing Rockafellow v. Baker, 41 Pa. 319 (1861)); See also
Geddes's Appeal, 80 Pa. 442 (1876); Rothermel v. Phillips, 141 A. 241 (Pa. 1928); Klerlein v.
Werner, 160 A. 719 (Pa. 1932); Cote v. Christy, 10 Pa. Super. 318 (1899); Wolford &
Wolford v. Conway, 92 Pa. Super. 550 (1927); See also, Byrne v. Stewart, 17 A. 19 (Pa.
1889); Mahaffey v. Ferguson, 27 A. 21 (Pa. 1893); Harrison v. Welsh, 145 A. 507 (Pa. 1929);
Emery v. Third Nat'l Bank, 162 A. 281 (Pa. 1932)).
167. Id. at 567 (citing section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543).
168. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 572.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 571.
172. 57 Pa. 120 (1868).
173. James 0. Person, Jr., Annotation, Failure to Disclose Extent or Value of Property
Owned as Ground for Avoiding Premarital Contract, 3 A.L.R.5th 394 (1993) (citing Kline v.
Kline, 57 Pa 120 (Pa. 1868)).
174. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 571-72.
175. Id at 572-
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reliance on the misrepresentation of the value of the ring was not
reasonable, concluding that if it truly was significant to her deci-
sion to go ahead with the marriage, she had ample time to have it
appraised. '76 The Porreco court would not sanction the avoidance
of an entire prenuptial agreement, which Susan understood, on
the basis of her unreasonable failure to have the ring appraised.'77
Since Simeone, parties to a prenuptial contract have had the same
duty to investigate as parties to any other contract. 7 ' Susan had
equal and ample opportunity to investigate the value of the en-
gagement ring, as reported by Louis, which comprised almost
forty-five percent of her assets, before signing the prenuptial con-
tract.9 Susan's failure to do this simple investigation left her
without a reasonable justifiable reliance to avoid the prenuptial
agreement.
80
As the majority points out, Susan's reliance was undermined by
her testimony that she would have signed the document no matter
what it said.' This proves that the value of the ring was not an
important factor in her decision to sign the prenuptial agreement.
In addition, under Simeone, a party is only required to disclose his
or her own assets.'82 The whole purpose of the prenuptial contract
was to fully and fairly disclose one's own assets so that the other
party could be fully informed when waiving all interests to those
assets. Louis fully and fairly disclosed his assets in the agree-
ment.' However, he materially misrepresented the value of
Susan's engagement ring on her financial statement that he had
prepared."' Even so, the majority concluded in Porreco that this
does not void the entire prenuptial contract, which Susan under-
stood the consequences of, on the basis of the material misrepre-
sentation, because of her unreasonable failure to investigate."5
Parties to a prenuptial contract, after the Porreco decision, are
under a duty to investigate the value of their own assets listed in
a financial statement, prepared by another party.'86 No party with
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 571.
179. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 572.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 571 n.5.
182. Id. at 570.
183. Id. at 568.
184. Porreco, 811 A.2d at 569.
185. Id. at 572.
186. Id. at 571.
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an equal and ample opportunity to investigate the value of their
own assets could claim reasonable justifiable reliance on the
value(s) as listed by the other party.8 7 Therefore, the only way
reasonable justifiable reliance in the material misrepresentation
of the asset(s), which led to the fraudulent inducement to enter
the contract, could be established would be if there were no equal
and ample opportunity to investigate the value of one's own as-
set(s) as listed by the other party.'
Brenden D. Long
187. Id.
188. Id. Siskin, 70 A.2d at 295.
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